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PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NOS.  03-3404, 03-3610, 03-3620
                    
DAULPH KLINE; TERRY KLINE,
individually, and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated; DAVID J. BIGG;
JOSEPH T. COULSON; ROBERT L.
LASH; JOHN M . SPEARS, JR.,
WILLIAM ALLEN; JAMES ALLEN;
J O H N  A L S V A N ;  E D W A R D
ANDERSON; KENNETH ARTERS, JR.;
T O N Y  A Z Z A R E L L O ;  T E R R Y
BACHERT; GLENN BALTHASER;
THOMAS BARTASHUS; FRANCIS
BEIERSCHMITT; GERALD BENDER;
JOE BICKELMAN; BRETT BILLINGS;
JOSEPH BISCANTI; VERNON BLOOM,
J R . ;  M I C H A E L  B O D O L U S ;
CHRISTOPHER BORN; PATRICIA
BORRELL; JEFFREY BOSTON; DAVID
M. BRAMLEY; THOMAS BRENEMAN;
WILLIAM BROWN; JOHN BUGERA;
ANTHONY BUONO; ANTHONY
CALCAGNO, JR.; JOSEPH CARDELL;
R I C H A R D  C A R L ;  W I L L I A M
CARPENTER; ALAN  CLOUSE R;
FRANK CRAMMER, JR.; ALFRED
CRAMMER, JR.; TERRY CROSSELY;
R O B E R T  C R U P I ;  A N D R E W
CUCCARO, JR.; LEE DALTON; MINH
DAO; ROBERT DAVIDSON; BRENT
D A V I S ;  T I M O T H Y  D E B E C K ;
M A R G A R E T  D E C K E R ;  M A RK
DETTERLINE; KENNETH DEWALD;
THOMAS DIETRICH; JOHN DILALLO;
BRIAN DOERRMAN; KENNETH
E C K E R T ;  B E R N A R D  E H R E T S ;
AN TO NIO  ESPINOSA;  JOSEPH
ESSICK; GARY ETTEL; BART FAUST;
STEPHEN FAUST; EDWARD FELEGI;
B R U C E  FISH BU RN ; W ILLIA M
F I SH E R ;  G E R A L D  F O G A R T Y ;
RAYMOND FOLK, JR.; MICHAEL
FREY; RICHARD FRITZ, JR., DERK
FRONHEISER; CASEY GANSTER;
J O H N  G A S P E R E T T I ;  J A M E S
GASPERETTI; SANDRA GAWNE;
DENNIS GAY; DONALD GEDDIO;
GEORGE GEIGER; RONALD GOREY;
CARL GRAEFF; RITCHIE GRETH;
PERRY GRIESEMER; GILL GROVE;
JOE GUIDO; JEFFREY HANNAHOE;
D O U G L A S HARR IS ;  RI C HA RD
HARRIS; JAY HARTMAN; JOHN
HEFT; RODERICK HELLER; GLENN
HELMAN; RICH HERB; JAMES HESS;
ROSE MARIE HESSLER; PATRICK
HOLLYWOOD; THOMAS HOLT; JOHN
HORNBERGER; MICHAEL HUBIAK;
KEVIN IMPINK; GARY JAMES; CHRIS
JONES; EDWIN JONES; MARVIN
KACHEL; JOHN KAHN, JR.; WALTER
KATCHUR; HARRY KAUFFMAN;
ALLAN KEHL; MARK KERBER;
LARRY KLINE; WILLIAM KOCUR;
MARK KRAMMES; ALBERT KUKLIS;
GARY LECHNER; TERRY LEESE;
BYRON LEIBY; GRANT LEONTI;
TODD LESHER; JOHN LISA; ROBERT
LONG; WALTER LOOSE; EDWARD
L U B A S ;  D A V I D  LU C A R E L L I ;
R A Y M O N D  L U T Z , I II ; G A R Y
MADARA; JAMES MARKUS; KARL
MATTERN; JEFFREY MAULICK;
JESSE MAY; EUGENE MCCLURE;
RICHARD MERSINGER; LAWRENCE
MICCICKE, JR.; WALTER MILLER;
2R I C H A R D  M IL LE R ;  T H O M A S
MOYER; RICHARD MULHOLLAND;
MICHAEL MULLIGAN; THOMAS
MULUTZIE; R. MUNDELL; JOHN
M U R R A Y ;  C H R I S T O P H E R
N E I T H A M E R ;  R A Y M O N D
NEUHEIMER; DAWN NIEDZIELSKI;
VITO NINFO; RAY OVERTON, JR.;
GEORGE PALM, JR.; HOWARD
PALMER; DONALD PAPP; CRAIG
P A W L I NG ;  DA VID  P H I L L I P S ;
WILLIAM PIANO; TIM PONATOSKI;
RONALD PORRINO; RORY QUINTER;
TERRY RAEZER; DANIEL REEVES;
K E I T H  R E IC H A R T ;  S H IR L E Y
REICHART; JEFFREY REIFSNYDER;
DENNIS REMP; LOU IS REYES;
FLOYD RHODES, IV; LOUIS RODINO;
JEFFREY ROTHERMEL; GEORGE
SALTZMAN, 3RD; RANDY SANDERS;
SAMUEL SCHAEFER; MICHAEL
SCHAEFFER; TERRY SCHAEFFER,
SR.; JOHN SCHAICH; RANDY SCHIES;
L IN D A  SCHLEGEL ;  D A R R E LL
S C H L E G E L ,  S R . ;  D A L L A S
SCHLIECHER; THOMAS SCHWARTZ;
A N T H O N Y  S E D O T I ;  E U G E N E
SEDOTI; JAMES SELTZER; TIMOTHY
SHERMAN; GENE SHIMP; GEORGE
S H I R E Y ,  J R . ;  C H R I S T O P H E R
SHOEMAKER; GEORGE SHUPP; PAUL
SILK; JOSEPH SPICA; RICHARD
S T IC H T E R ;  C U R T I S  S T I E L Y ;
DOUGLAS STROHL; THEODORE
SULLIVAN; NORMAN SUNDAY;
JOSEPH TOKONITZ; FREDERICK
TRATE, JR.; WALTERS VACULA;
RICHARD VALENTINE; BARRY
WALTERS; DAVID WALTERS; BRIAN
W A L T E R S ;  R I C H A R D
W A W R Z Y N I A K ,  J R . ;  L A R R Y
W E B B E R ;  K E N N E T H
W E I D E N H E I M E R ;  K E N N E T H
WEIKEL; VICTOR WELLER, JR.;
CALVIN WILLIAMS; LAWRENCE
W I L L I A M S ,  J R . ;  R O B E R T
WILLIAMSON; RICHARD WOLF;
MARC WOLFE; MIKE XAVIOS;
TERRY ZERBE; JOHN ZIATS; STEVE
A R T H U R ; WIL LLIA M  B A N G S;
WILLIAM BARNHART; THOMAS
BARRETT; RAYMOND BARTON;
MARLIN BASHORE; BRIAN BATES;
PETER BECKER; RON BESSIL, JR.;
H E L E N  B I L L M A N ;  J A Y
B L A N K E N B IL L E R ; B R A D F O RD
BOLL; ROBERT BORD; PAUL BOYER;
GREGORY BOYER; SAM BROBST;
R O B E R T C H ILA , SR .;  L EW IS
COLLINS; BRIAN CONRAD; FERRELL
COOPER; GARY COOPER; ROBERT
COULTER; MICHAEL DAVIDSON;
DAVID DEANGELO; PAUL DELBO,
SR.; RICHARD DIEHL; LARRY
DURHAM; GLENN FISHER; EVAN
FOURNRIS; ANTHONY GATTO, JR.;
S T E P H E N  G E R A S ;  A L F R E D
GIACOMINI; GEORGE GRENUS;
L A F A Y E T T E  H A Y E S ;  J O H N
HECKMAN, SR.; RANDY HERTZOG;
DENNIS HILL; JOHN HORNING;
S H A W N  I N G R A M ;  S T A N L E Y
JOHNSON; RUSSELL KLINE; LESTER
KLOCK; RICHARD KOHARCHECK;
KEITH KRAMMES; ROBIN KRICK;
STEVEN KRUSZEWSKI; RAYMOND
KUBACKI, JR.; S. KEITH KULP;
PA TR ICIA  LAYTON;  TH O M A S
LECHNER; TH EO DO RE LEW IS;
JOSEPH LISA; ROSALIE LONG;
3J O S E P H  M A R O N E ;  G E O R G E
MATALAVAGE; JAMES MAY; JACK
M C N E R N Y ,  J R . ;  W I L L I A M
MERRIWEATHER; H. DAVID MILLER;
JANE MILLER; WILLIAM MOLINA;
ANDREW MOORE; GARY MOYER;
S C O T T  N E I T H A M E R ;  G L E N N
NEWCOMB; MAURIO PETA; GERARD
PETERKA; RANDALL PHILLIPS;
RICHARD PHILLIP S; WILLIA M
PICKUP, JR.; MIKE PINKASAVAGE;
RONALD  PRESSLEY; JEFFREY
PRINCE; DON QUIRE; STEVEN
REICHART; WIN FRED ROMAN;
KEVIN RORKE; BARRY SCHAEFFER;
DONALD SCHIEN; TODD SWARTZ;
GENE SEDOTI; WILLIAM SHUPP, III;
ANNETTE SICENAVAGE; JAMES
S IM M O N S ;  B A R R Y  S NY D E R ;
R O B E R T  S N Y D E R ,  J R . ,  D .
STUBBLEBINE; ANGELO TADDEO;
STEPHEN THOMPSON;  TERRY
TRAYER; JOHN WALCHAK, JR.;
R O B E R T  W A L L A C E ;  A R L A N
WEAVER; TERRY WENZ; RON
W E S S N E R ; W A D E  W E S S N ER ;
RICHARD WOLF; ROBERT YENSER;
CHARLES ZAMBIASI; GREGORY D.
ARTERS; AARON C. AUGHTRY;
K E N N E T H  B A I R ;  G L EN N  D .
BEARSTIER; DALE A. BENDER;
MARIO B I SB A NO;  HARRY E.
BOWERS, JR.; JIMMIE CALDWELL;
JOSEPH T. COULSTON, JR.; HOWARD
C. CRAWFORD, JR.; KURT D. DAHMS;
GREGORY L. DUFFIN; PATRICK J.
DUGGAN; ROY M. FLOWERS; LEROY
G. FREY; MICHAEL J. GALAVAGE;
NATHAN A. GARBER; DERRICK L.
G R A V ES; ARNEL C .  G R E T H;
MICHAEL R. HANSFORD; STEVEN J.
HAUGER; DENIS J. HEYDT; JOHN J.
HOMKA, JR.; MARC HUNTZINGER;
THOMAS C. ISETT; CHRISTOPHER W.
JONES; ROBERT C. JONES; Individually
and in his capacity as Pottstown Borough
Manager; TIMOTHY O. KAHL; DIANE
LEFFLER; G E R A L D  E.  LUTZ;
WILLIAM M. MCANDREW; SCOTT R.
MELL; JEFFREY S. NOLL; GEORGE R.
O'NEILL; RICKY C. OSWALD;
KENNETH A. PLANER; WILLIAM H.
RAVERT; SALVATORE L. RIZZO;
G R E G O R Y  C .  S A N C I N E L L A ;
RICHARD D. TOLLAND; KENNETH
WARFIELD; GARY L. WEISS; LARRY
L. WOLFE; JOSEPH E. YAKAITIS;
F R A NC IS  M . Z E L L ER ; J O HN
CONTSICOS; HAROLD J. FASIG;
CHARLES E. FELTY, JR.; DALE FOX;
CARL FURILLO; MICHAEL GROSS;
TOM HOLLAND; MARK K. OUDINOT;
JEFFREY G. RACZKA, SR.; GERALD
B .  R H O A D S ;  A N T H O N Y  W .
ROTKISKE, JR.; RICHARD J. SEISLER,
II; JOSEPH F. SHOUMLISKY,
Appellants in No. 03-3404
Cross Appellees in Nos. 03-3610
and 03-3620
                        v.
SECURITY GUARDS, INC.
Appellant in No. 03-3610
Cross Appellee in No. 03-3404;
DANA CORPORATION
Appellant in No. 03-3620
Cross Appellee in No. 03-3404
4                    
On Appeal From the United States 
District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-00566)
District Judge:  Hon. Franklin S.
 VanAntwerpen
Magistrate Judge:  Hon. Linda K. 
Caracappa
                   
Argued June 29, 2004
BEFORE:  AMBRO, ALDISERT and
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: October 6, 2004)
                    
Joseph F. Roda (Argued)
Roda & Nast
801 Estelle Drive
Lancaster, PA  17601
  Attorney for Daulph Kline, et al.
  Appellants in No. 03-3404
  Cross Appellees in Nos. 03-3610
  and 03-3620
Scott L. Vernick
Joshua Horn (Argued)
Emil J. Kiehne
Fox Rothschild
2000 Market Street
10th Floor
Philadelphia, PA  19103
  Attorneys for Security Guards, Inc.
  Appellant in No.  03-3610
  Cross Appellee in No. 03-3404
Scott F. Cooper (Argued)
Scott A. Mayer
Blank Rome
One Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA  19103
  Attorneys for Dana Corporation
  Appellant in No. 03-3620
  Cross Appellee in No. 03-3404
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Daulph Kline and Terry Kline
brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas
of Berks County, in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, against Dana Corporation
(“Dana”), Security Guards, Inc. (“SGI”),
and Radio Maintenance, Inc. (“RMI”;
collectively, the “Defendants”) asserting
n u merous  c l a ims  a r i s ing  u n d e r
Pennsylvania law.  Defendants thereafter
removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, contending that Appellants’
claims were completely preempted by §
301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.  RMI
was ultimately dismissed as a party and
judgment was entered in favor of Dana and
SGI.  This appeal followed.  Because we
conclude that the District Court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over any
of the state law claims asserted in the
complaint, we will vacate the judgment
and remand to the District Court with
instructions to return this case to the
5Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.    
I.
This case arises out of Dana’s
alleged surveillance of its hourly
employees at one of its facilities in
Reading, Pennsylvania.  Dana, a Virginia
corporation, is a manufacturer of
au tomobi le  and  t ruck  assembly
components.  During the relevant period,
its hourly employees working at the
facility were represented by the United
Steel Workers of America, Local 3733 (the
“Union”) and were subject to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between
Dana and the Union.   
On September 28, 1998, Dana
installed an audio and video surveillance
system in an entryway at its Reading
facility.  The system was allegedly
purchased from, and installed by, RMI.  It
consisted of two cameras with built-in
microphones, a monitor with a built-in
speaker, and a twenty-four hour video
cassette recorder.  The system enabled
Dana to monitor the entryway, which was
the location at which its hourly employees
were required to “punch-in.”  The cameras
automatically sent video and audio signals
to the monitor, which was located in a
guard booth adjacent to the entryway.  The
guard booth was operated by employees of
SGI, a Pennsylvania corporation, which
had contracted with Dana since 1989 to
provide it with security services.  The SGI
guards operating the booth reported to, and
were supervised by, Dana managers.  
Approximately one week after
installation of the system, two hourly
employees at the Reading facility, Terry
and Daulph Kline, learned from certain
SGI guards operating the guard booth that
the surveillance system had the capacity to
t r a n s m i t  t o  t h e  mo n i to r  o r a l
communications taking place in the
entryway.  The Klines then reported this
fact to their Union representatives.  Over
the course of the following weeks, the
Union made inquiries of Dana’s
management concerning its use of the
surveillance system.  These inquiries
resulted in the removal of the system on
October 29, 1998.  
Terry and Daulph Kline filed a
complaint against Defendants in the Court
of Common Pleas of Berks County, in the
Co mm onw ealth  of  Pennsy lvania ,
asserting, in sixty-nine counts, (1) claims
under the Pennsylvania Wire Tapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act (the
“Wiretap Act”), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725;
(2) claims under the Pennsylvania Private
Detective Act of 1953 (the “Detective
Act”), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 26; and (3)
various Pennsylvania common law tort
causes of action, including invasion of
privacy.1  Shortly thereafter, Defendants
     1Thirty of those counts were asserted
against Defendants under § 5725 of the
Wiretap Act, which provides a civil cause
of action for any person whose oral
communications are intercepted, disclosed,
or used, to recover against any person who
intercepts, discloses, or uses such oral
communications in violation of the
Wiretap Act.  Four of the counts asserted
civil conspiracy claims under § 16 of the
6removed the case to the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
filed motions to dismiss.  The Klines  filed
a motion to remand.  The District Court,
without opinion, denied both the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and the
Klines’ motion to remand.  Accordingly,
the District Court retained jurisdiction and
allowed the matter to proceed.2  This
appeal was filed following the entry of
final judgment
II.
We are presented with a final order
of a District Court to review.  Accordingly,
we have appellate jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.  It is not clear, however, that the
District Court had subject matter
jurisdiction to enter that judgment, and we
are obliged to raise and resolve that
jurisdictional issue before addressing the
merits of this appeal.  Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 364 F.3d
102, 104 (3d Cir. 2004).
According to Dana and SGI, the
District Court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction because at least three
categories of Appellants’ claims were
completely preempted by § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185: (1) the
Wiretap Act claims; (2) the tort law
invasion of privacy claims; and (3) the tort
law negligent or reckless supervision
claims.  Appellants insist, however, that
the LMRA was not implicated in any of
their claims.  We agree with Appellants
that subject matter jurisdiction was
lacking.3  
Detective Act, alleging that Dana, SGI,
and RMI violated, and conspired to
violate, this statute by forming a scheme to
intercept and disclose Plaintiffs’ oral
communications to the detriment of their
rights to form, join, or assist a labor union,
and their constitutional rights to
association, collective bargaining, and
assembly.  Six counts asserted tort claims
against Defendants for invasion of privacy.
Twelve counts asserted that Defendants
had negligently or recklessly supervised
their duly authorized officers, agents,
servants, or employees, thereby causing
harm to Plaintiffs.  Eight counts asserted
that Defendants had negligently or
recklessly supervised the premises or
instrumentalities under their control.  Six
counts asserted a respondeat superior
theory against Defendants for the actions
of their employees.  Two counts asserted
that Dana had failed to exercise reasonable
care to protect Appellants as business
invitees.  The final count asserted class
action allegations.
     2The District Court denied the Klines’
motion for class certification, and they
w e r e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  j o i n e d  b y
approximately 370 additional plaintiffs
who were hourly employees at Dana’s
Reading facility.
     3“We exercise plenary review in
determining whether the District Court had
subject matter jurisdiction.”  Bracken v.
Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing Wujick v. Dale & Dale, Inc.,
7A.
“Only state-court actions that
originally could have been filed in federal
court may be removed to federal court by
the defendant.”  Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).  If
Appellants’ case could not have been filed
originally in federal court, then removal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 was improper and
Appellants would be entitled to the remand
they initially requested.  See Roxbury
Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Anthony S. Cupo
Agency, 316 F.3d 224, 227 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Removal jurisdiction under section 1441
is . . . wholly derived from original federal
jurisdiction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) (“If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded.”).  Here, diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was
unavailable because SGI is a Pennsylvania
corporation and the Klines were both
Pennsylvania citizens.  Accordingly, we
must determine whether federal question
jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. §
1331.  See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392
(“Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-
question jurisdiction is required [for
removal].”).
As the Supreme Court explained in
Caterpillar:
The presence or absence of
federal-question jurisdiction
is governed by the “well-
pleaded complaint rule,”
which provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when
a federal question is
presented on the face of the
plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.  See Gully v.
First National Bank, 299
U.S. 109, 112-113, 57 S. Ct.
96, 97-98, 81 L. Ed. 70
(1936).  The rule makes the
plaintiff the master of the
claim; he or she may avoid
federal jurisdiction by
exclusive reliance on state
law.
Id.  As we have indicated, Appellants’
complaint in this case indeed sounded
entirely in state law.  That does not,
however, end our analysis.
There is an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule that precludes a
plaintiff from “avoid[ing] a federal forum
by ‘artfully pleading’ what is, in essence,
a federal claim solely in terms of state
law.”  Tifft v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
366 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for
Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 22
(1983)).  This exception, described as an
“independent corollary” to the well-
pleaded complaint rule is the so-called
“com plete  p reempt ion”  doc t r ine .
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.  In
Caterpillar, the Supreme Court articulated
this doctrine as follows:
On occasion, the Court has
concluded that the pre-
43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir.1994)). 
8emptive force of a statute is
so “extraordinary” that it
“converts an ordinary state
common-law complaint into
one stating a federal claim
for purposes of the well-
pleaded complaint rule.”
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
[v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65
(1987)].  Once an area of
s t a t e  l a w  h a s  b e en
completely pre-empted, any
claim purportedly based on
that pre-empted state law is
c o n s i d e re d ,  f rom  i t s
inception, a federal claim,
and therefore arises under
federal law.  See Franchise
Tax Board, supra, 463 U.S.,
at 24, 103 S. Ct., at 2854
(“[I]f a federal cause of
action completely pre-empts
a state cause of action any
complaint that comes within
the scope of the federal
cause of action necessarily
‘arises under’ federal law”).
Id.  
Section 301 of the LMRA has been
held to possess this preemptive force.  See
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23.  It
provides:
Suits for violation of
contra cts  be tween an
employer and a labor
organization representing
employees in an industry
affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor
organizations, may be
brought in any district court
of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the
amount in controversy or
without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C.§ 185(a).  We have previously
had occasion to review extensively the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
the complete preemption of state law
claims under § 301 of the LMRA.  See,
e.g., Voilas v. General Motors Corp., 170
F.3d 367, 373-76 (3d Cir. 1999); Trans
Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d
217, 228-30 (3d Cir. 1995); Berda v. CBS,
Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 22-25 (3d Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, we will review the relevant
principles only briefly. 
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202 (1985), the Supreme Court
set forth the standard for determining
when a state law claim is completely
preempted by § 301: “[W]hen resolution of
a state-law claim is substantially
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a
labor contract, that claim must either be
treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as
pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.”
Id. at 220 (citation omitted).  In that case,
the plaintiff brought a state tort claim
against his employer for the bad-faith
processing of an insurance claim.  The
Court concluded that this cause of action
was completely preempted by § 301
9because “[t]he duties imposed and rights
established through the state tort . . . derive
from the rights and obligations established
by the [collective-bargaining] contract,”
and resolution of the dispute would
therefore “inevitably . . . involve contract
interpretation.”  Id. at 217-18.  The
Supreme Court noted, however, that “it
would be inconsistent with congressional
intent under [§ 301] to pre-empt state rules
that proscribe conduct, or establish rights
and obligations, independent of a labor
contract.”  Id. at 212. 
Subsequently, in Caterpillar, 482
U.S. 386, the Court considered whether §
301 permitted employees, who were
covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, to bring state law contract
claims for breach of individual contracts
between each employee and their
employer.  After reiterating that § 301
“governs claims founded directly on rights
c rea ted  by  co ll ec tive -b argain ing
agreements, and also claims substantially
dependent on analysis of a collective
bargaining agreement,”  the Court
concluded that the employees’ state claims
for breach of their individual employment
contracts were not preempted.  Id. at 394
(internal quotation omitted).  The Court
reasoned:
Section 301 says nothing
about the content or validity
of individual employment
contracts.  It is true that
respondents, bargaining unit
members at the time of the
plant closing, possessed
substantial rights under the
collective agreement, and
could have brought suit
under § 301.  As masters of
the complaint, however,
they chose not to do so.
Moreover, . . . respondents’
c o m p l a i n t  i s  n o t
substantially dependent
upon interpretation of the
c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g
agreement.  It does not rely
u p o n  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e
agreement indirectly, nor
d o e s  i t  addre ss  th e
relationship between the
individual contracts and the
collective agreement.
Id. at 394-95.  We have described
Caterpillar as standing for the proposition
that “employees have the option of
vindicating their interests by means of
either a section 301 action or an action
brought under state law, as long as the
state-law action as pleaded does not
require interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement.”  Voilas, 170 F.3d
at 373-74 (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at
394-95).
The Supreme Court next addressed
§ 301 in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), where it
considered whether that provision
completely preempted an employee’s state
law retaliatory discharge claim against her
employer.  The Court’s analysis focused
first upon the elements necessary to make
a prima facie retaliatory discharge claim
under the relevant state law: (1) discharge
10
or a threat of discharge, and (2) a motive
to deter the employee from exercising her
rights.  These elements, the court noted,
constituted “purely factual questions
pertain[ing] to the conduct of the employee
and the conduct and motivation of the
employer,” neither of which “require[d] a
court to interpret any term of a collective-
bargaining agreement.”  Id. at 407.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
employee’s state claim was “independent”
of the relevant collective-bargaining
agreement for purposes of § 301 because
“resolution of the state-law claim d[id] not
require  construing the collective
bargaining agreement.”  Id.  Morever, the
Court found it irrelevant that “the state-law
analysis might well involve attention to the
same factual considerations as the
contractual determination of whether [the
employee] was fired for just cause [under
her collective-bargaining agreement].”  Id.
at 408.  “[S]uch parallelism,” according to
the Court, would not “render[] the state-
law analysis dependent upon the
contractual analysis.”  The Court opined
that the reason for this was that
§ 301 pre-emption merely
ensures that federal law will
be the basis for interpreting
c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g
agreements, and  says
n o t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e
substantive rights a State
may provide to workers
when adjudication of those
rights does not depend upon
t h e  in te rp re ta t io n  o f
[ co l l e c t i v e -barg a in in g ]
agreements.  In other words,
even if dispute resolution
pursuant to a collective-
bargaining agreement, on
the one hand, and state law,
on the other, would require
addressing precisely the
same set of facts, as long as
the state-law claim can be
r e s o l v e d  w i t h o u t
interpreting the agreement
i t se l f ,  t h e  c la im  i s
“ in depe nden t”  of  the
agreement for § 301 pre-
emption purposes.
Id. at 409-410.
The Supreme Court addressed §
301 preemption most recently in Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).  There,
the Court was required to consider whether
§ 301 preempted a plaintiff’s state law
claim to recover a statutory penalty arising
from her former employer’s payment of
late wages.  The Court began its analysis
by summarizing the relevant controlling
principles:
[T]he pre-emption rule has
been applied only to assure
that the purposes animating
§ 301 will be frustrated
neither by state laws
purporting to determine
“questions relating to what
the parties to a labor
agreement agreed, and what
legal consequences were
intended to flow from
breaches of that agreement,”
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nor by parties’ efforts to
renege on their arbitration
promises by “relabeling” as
tort suits actions simply
alleging breaches of duties
assumed in collective-
bargaining agreements . . . .
In [Allis-Chalmers] and in
Lingle . . . , we underscored
the point that § 301 cannot
be read broadly to pre-empt
n o n n e g o t i a b l e  r i g h t s
conferred on individual
employees as a matter of
state law, and we stressed
that it is the legal character
of a claim, as “independent”
o f  r igh t s  u nder  th e
c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g
agreement (and not whether
a grievance arising from
“precisely the same set of
facts” could be pursued) that
decides whether a state
cause of action may go
forward.  Finally, we were
clear that when the meaning
of contract terms is not the
subject of dispute, the bare
fact that a collective-
bargaining agreement will
be consulted in the course of
state-law litigation plainly
does not require the claim to
be extinguished.
Id. at 122-24 (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).  Applying these
principles, the Court reasoned that
[t]he only issue raised by
[the plaintiff’s] claim,
whether [her employer]
“willfully fail[ed] to pay”
her wages promptly upon
severance, was a question of
s t a t e  l a w ,  e n t i r e l y
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  a n y
understanding embodied in
the collective-bargaining
agreement between the
union and the employer.
There is no indication that
there was a “dispute” in this
case over the amount of the
penalty to which [the
plaintiff] would be entitled,
and Lingle makes plain in so
many words that when
liability is governed by
independent state law, the
mere need to “look to” the
c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g
agreement for damages
computation is no reason to
hold the state-law claim
defeated by § 301.
Id. at 124-25.  Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the plaintiff’s state law
claim was not completely preempted by §
301 of the LMRA.
B.
At the outset, we address Dana’s
and SGI’s general contentions with respect
to Appellants’ state law claims.  According
to Dana and SGI, the state claims go to the
“core” of Dana’s management rights, a
subject of collective bargaining.  They also
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argue that Appellants’ state claims
“ n e c e s s a r i l y  i m p l i c a t e ”  t h e
“Management’s Rights” and “Shop Rules”
clauses of the CBA between Dana and the
U n i o n . 4   D a n a  a n d
     4The relevant portion of the CBA
provides:
A R T I C L E  1 1 .
M A N A G E M E N T ’ S
RIGHTS
Section 1.  General
T h e  U n i o n
recognizes the rights and
responsibilities belonging
solely to the Company, such
as the rights to decide the
number and location of
plants, the machine and tool
equipment, the products to
be manuf acture d,  the
method of manufacture, the
schedules of production, the
processes of manufacturing
or assembling, together with
all designing engineering
and the control of raw
m a t e r i a l s ,  s e m i -
manufactured, and finished
parts  w hich  may b e
incorpora ted into th e
products manufactured.
When required by
Management, employees
necessary to maintain
protection of the Company’s
property shall under no
condition suspend work.
Section 2. Promotions –
Discipline – Discharge
The right to promote,
and the right to discipline
and discharge for proper
cause are likewise the sole
respons ib i l i ty o f  th e
Management.  Provided, the
claims of discriminatory
promotions and of wrongful
or unjust discipline or
discharges shall be subject
to the Grievance Procedure
herein provided.
Proper cause for
discipline and discharge
shall be determined in
accordance with the rules
and procedures outlined in
Exhibit B, Shop Rules and
violations of Shop Rules.  If
no rule exists under the
S h o p  R u l e s  t h e n
management’s rights would
apply.
Section 3. Order and
Efficiency
(a) The right to hire
and to maintain order and
efficiency is the sole
respo ns ib i l i ty  o f  th e
Management.
(b) There will be no
hiring of part-time or
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SGI therefore contend that the claims
cannot be analyzed without reference to
the CBA.  While it is true that the CBA
may be consulted in the course of litigating
Appellants’ claims, it does not follow that
their claims are completely preempted.
In Trans Penn Wax Corp. v.
McCandless, 50 F.3d at 230-31, we
addressed, and rejected, a similar argument
in support of finding complete preemption
under § 301.  In that case, the plaintiff
employees were subject to a collective-
bargaining agreement between their
employer and their union, but had also
entered into individual employment
contracts in which the employer
guaranteed their job security.  Several of
the employees were later terminated and
thereafter brought state law claims against
their employer for breach of contract,
fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, relating to the
representations made by the employer in
their individual employment contracts.
One of the arguments advanced by the
employer in favor of finding preemption
was that the “foundation” of the state law
tort and contract claims was “job security
in the face of layoffs or discharge,” a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining
and a subject covered in the collective
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 230.
Consequently, the employer argued, the
claims were dependent upon the applicable
collective-bargaining agreement and
should be preempted by § 301.  We
rejected this argument, reasoning that 
[t]he employees have not
alleged [that the employer]
violated the terms and
conditions of the collective
ba rga in ing  agreemen t .
While the state law claims
here relate to job security,
they are grounded in the
g u a ra n t e e  g i v e n  t h e
e m p l o y e e s  b y  [ t h e
employer].  The collective
bargaining agreement does
not mention the individual
employment contracts, nor
does [the employer] explain
how  the  c la ims  a re
substantially dependent on
analysis of the collective
bargaining agreement.  The
fact that job security is
addressed in the collective
bargaining agreement is “of
no consequence, because
[the employees] need not
refer to ... the collective
bargaining agreement in
order to make out [their]
claim.”  Berda, 881 F.2d at
temporary employees
to do any work that
is performed by
b a r g a i n i n g  u n i t
employees.
App. at 605.  The “Shop Rules” exhibit to
the CBA prescribes conduct that covered
employees are prohibited from engaging
in, as well as procedures for dealing with
the prescribed infractions.  
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27.
Id. at 230-31 (footnote omitted).  In
rejecting the employer’s argument, we also
noted that “‘there is nothing novel about
recognizing that substantive rights in the
labor relations context can exist without
in t e rp re t ing  co l l ec t ive-bar g a i n ing
agreements.”  Id. at 231 (quoting Lingle,
486 U.S. at 411).
Similarly here, Appellants have not
alleged a violation of any term or
condition of the CBA.  Nor does it appear
from the face of their complaint that any of
their state claims are founded upon rights
created by the CBA.  Although their state
claims relate to conduct that Defendants
engaged in at Appellants’ workplace, those
claims, as in Trans Penn Wax, are
nonetheless grounded in substantive rights
granted under state law.  Moreover, the
CBA itself makes no mention of the use of
video cameras, microphones, or other
surveillance of any kind.  Like Trans Penn
Wax, the essential question is not whether
Appellants’ claims relate to a subject –
management’s rights – contemplated by
the CBA.  In fact, Caterpillar and Lingle
both recognize that a finding of
preemption under § 301 is not required
even if the same set of facts may give rise
to a state law claim as well as an action for
violation of the CBA.  Rather, the
dispositive question here is whether
Appellants’ state claims require any
interpretation of a provision of the CBA.
Id. at 229 (“[A] plaintiff may bring a state
law tort action against an employer, even
where he could have brought a similar
claim based on a provision in his collective
bargaining agreement, so long as the state
claim does not require interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement.”).
Although Dana and SGI rely upon
the “Management’s Rights” and “Shop
Rules” clauses of the CBA, they do not
point to any specific provision of these
clauses that must be interpreted in order to
resolve Appellants’ claims.  Nor can we
identify any provision that would require
interpretation.  A finding of § 301
preemption is not mandated simply by the
contention that Appellants’ state law
claims “necessarily implicate” the CBA.
That is, the mere fact that we must look at
the CBA in order to determine that it is
silent on any issue relevant to Appellants’
state claims does not mean that we have
“interpreted” the CBA.  As the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently
stated in applying Livadas:
[A]lleging a hypothetical
connection between the
[state law] claim and the
terms of the CBA is not
enough to preempt the
claim: adjudication of the
c l a i m  m u s t  r e q u i r e
interpretation of a provision
of the CBA.  A creative
linkage between the subject
matter of the claim and the
wording of a CBA provision
is insufficient; rather, the
proffered interpreta tion
argument must reach a
r e a s o n a b l e  l e v e l  o f
credibility.  Cf. Livadas, 512
U.S. at 124-25, 114 S. Ct.
15
2068.  The argument does
not become credible simply
because the court may have
to consult the CBA to
evaluate it; “look[ing] to”
the CBA merely to discern
that none of its terms is
reasonably in dispute does
not require preemption. Id.
at 125, 114 S. Ct. 2068.   
Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways Inc.,
255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).  
With this background, we turn to
each of the Appellants’ state law claims to
de termine  wh ether th ey  requir e
interpretation of the CBA.
1.
Appellants claim that Defendants
violated § 5725 of the Wiretap Act.  Such
a claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate:
“(1) that he engaged in [an oral]
communication; (2) that he possessed an
expectation that the communication would
not be intercepted; (3) that his expectation
was justifiable under the circumstances;
and (4) that the defendant attempted to, or
s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n t e r c e p t e d  t h e
communication, or encouraged another to
do so.”  Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519,
522 (Pa. 1998).  In Agnew, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that “a
conversation amounts to a protected ‘oral
communication’ under the Wiretap Act
only where the speaker possessed  a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the
conversation.”  Id. at 523.  Moreover, the
Court decided that “the standard for such
expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable,”
which “is necessarily an objective
standard.”  Id.
Dana and SGI insist that this claim
is completely preempted by § 301 of the
LMRA because the justifiable expectation
of Appellants cannot be determined
without reference to Dana’s bargained-for
management rights to direc t the
supervision of employees.  We regard this
argument as foreclosed by our decision in
Trans Penn Wax.  As we have noted, the
employees in that case alleged that the
employer’s breach of its guarantees of job
security, granted in individual contracts
with the employees, constituted fraud and
the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  Under Pennsylvania law, one of
the elements required for a fraud claim
was that the plaintiff justifiably relied on
the defendant’s misrepresentations.  One
of the essential elements of a cause of
action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was a showing that the
defendant’s conduct was “extreme and
outrageous.”  Much like Dana and SGI, the
employer in that case argued that the only
way to determine whether the employees
were justified in relying upon its
representations guaranteeing job security
or whether its conduct had been “extreme
and outrageous” was to interpret the
appl ic able  co l l ec t ive  barg ainin g
agreement.  In both instances, the
employer suggested, the collective
bargaining agreement was part of the
context in which the issue had to be
addressed.  Arguably, for example, the
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collective-bargaining agreement could
have contained provisions that undermined
the employees’ allegation that their
reliance upon the separate guarantees was
justified.  Nonetheless, we rejected the
employer’s argument, holding that neither
of these two tort claims was completely
preempted by § 301.  We pointed out that
the “justifiable reliance” and “extreme and
outrageous conduct” were “purely factual
questions,” the resolution of which did not
“require[] interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement [or] substantially
depend[] on its construction.”  Trans Penn
Wax, 50 F.3d at 232.  The fact that a
collective bargaining agreement was part
of the context in which an employee’s
claim must be addressed thus did not
trigger complete preemption in the absence
of some substantial dispute over the
meaning of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Based on Trans Penn Wax, we must
reject Dana and SGI’s contention that the
only way to determine whether Appellants
had a justifiable expectation of privacy is
by interpreting the CBA.  Appellants’
justifiable expectations can be determined
by a state court simply by considering the
conduct of Dana and the facts and
circumstances of Appellants’ workplace.
Dana has provided no reason to believe
that such a determination will require the
resolution of any dispute concerning rights
or obligations contained in the CBA, and
we are unable to perceive one.  “[W]hen
the meaning of contract terms is not the
subject of dispute, the bare fact that a
collective bargaining agreement will be
consulted in the course of state law
litigation plainly does not require the
claims to be extinguished.”  Livadas, 512
U.S. at 124.
Dana and SGI insist that their
argument is supported by numerous cases
that have found state law invasion of
privacy claims completely preempted by §
301.  See, e.g., In re General Motors
Corp., 3 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 1993);
Mock v. T.G. & Y . Stores Co., 971 F.2d
522 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Amoco
Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706
(7th Cir. 1992); and Kirby v. Allegheny
Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir.
1987).  We find these cases either
inapposite or lacking in continued vitality
following the Supreme Court case law we
have earlier discussed.  Moreover, to the
extent any of them is in tension with Trans
Penn Wax, we must, of course, remain
faithful to that decision.
In Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage
Corp., a plaintiff brought a state law
invasion of privacy claim against his
employer after he was forced to submit to
a search of his person and then forced to
resign after refusing to submit to a search
of his automobile.  The employer removed
the case to federal court and sought
dismissal on grounds of complete
preemption by § 301 of the LMRA; the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
agreed.  It reasoned that “the issues
presented by the search in this case are
‘grist for the mill of grievance procedures
and arbitration.’”  Id. at 256 (quoting
Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703,
705 (5th Cir. 1985)).  According to the
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Court, it was clear that the plaintiff could
refuse to submit to the search, and if
dismissed, could have challenged the
terminat ion under  the grievance
procedures provided for in his CBA.
Furthermore, the Court noted, if his union
had refused to submit a grievance, the
plaintiff could have then sued his union for
breach of the duty of fair representation,
under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
According to the Court, “the availability of
remedies under the labor contract
precludes appellant’s pursuit of those
remedies in a state law tort action.”  Kirby,
811 F.2d at 256.  
We are unable to reconcile this
conclusion with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Caterpillar, which was decided
four months after Kirby.  As we noted
above, Caterpillar holds that an employee
has the option of vindicating his interests
by seeking a remedy available under a
collective-bargaining agreement or by
bringing a state court action, as long as the
state law action does not require
interpretation of the collective-bargaining
agreement.  482 U.S. at 394-95.  Thus,
Kirby’s holding – that the availability of a
labor contract remedy precluded a state
tort action brought to vindicate the same
interests – did not survive Caterpillar.  
In In re Amoco Petroleum Additives
Co., an employee sued for invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress after Amoco installed a
camera outside of the women’s locker
room.  With respect to complete
preemption, the employee argued that his
state law claims did not depend on the
meaning of the applicable collective-
bargaining agreement.  Although the
employee conceded that the collective-
bargaining agreement could have
authorized the surveillance, he noted that
nothing in the agreement actually
mentioned cameras, locker rooms, or
surveillance in general.  The Court agreed
with Am oco, h owever, that the
management-rights provision of the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement
could fairly be read as a “residual clause”
commuting “everything that [was] neither
regulated nor forbidden by the . . .
agreement . . . to [the] discretion” of the
employer.  Since this arguable reading
wo uld  au thor ize  the  cha llenged
surveillance, the Court concluded that a
“state court could not award damages
without first construing the collective
bargaining agreement and rejecting
A m o c o ’ s  in te rp r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e
management-rights clause.”  Id. at 709.
The Amoco Court relied primarily
on Kirby and Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc.,
914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990).  Just as we
have concluded that Kirby did not survive
Caterpillar, an en banc Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has concluded that Stikes
did not survive the ensuing Supreme Court
jur isprudence .  See Cram er v .
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d
683, 692 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Given
that jurisprudence, it is not clear to us that
we would have reached the same result
reached by the Amoco Court.  In any event,
it is clear to us that the “Management
Rights” article of the agreement before us
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cannot arguably be read as a residual
clause committing everything not covered
in the agreement to management’s
discretion.  For that reason, Amoco is
inapposite here.  
In Mock, an employee brought suit
against T.G. & Y. for invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional
distress resulting from an investigation
conducted by T.G. & Y. into employee
misconduct and the employee’s subsequent
termination.  The Court held these claims
preempted, reasoning as follows:
Under the CBA, T.G&Y.
could conduct such an
investigation and could
terminate any employee for
“just cause.”  An analysis of
whether T.G.&Y. acted
properly or no t wil l
inevit ably  requi re  an
analysis of what the CBA
permitted.
Mock, 971 F.2d at 530.  Thus, in Mock, as
in Amoco, provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement could fairly be read
to authorize the employer’s conduct.
Finally, in In re General Motors
Corp., an employee brought suit against
General Motors for invasion of privacy
after General Motors, during the course of
the employee’s grievance proceeding,
allegedly revealed that the employee had
sought drug and alcohol abuse counseling
through an employee assistance program
prescribed by the applicable collective-
bargaining agreement.  Under the
collective-bargaining agreement, such
program participation was to remain
confidential.  The Court concluded that the
duty of confidentiality alleged to have
been violated arose from the collective-
bargaining agreement, and the invasion of
privacy claim was therefore completely
preempted.  Thus, the right allegedly
violated – the right to confidential use of
an employee drug and alcohol abuse
counseling program – arose out of a
collective-bargaining agreement and,
accordingly, the plaintiff was necessarily
relying on the terms of the labor contract.
Appellants in our case have made no
reference, nor need they make reference, to
any provision of the CBA.  
2.
Appellants also claim that
Defendants committed the tort of invasion
of privacy.  “An action for invasion of
privacy is comprised of four distinct torts:
(1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2)
appropriation of name or likeness, (3)
publicity given to private life and (4)
publicity placing the person in a false
light.”  Harris v. Easton Publishing Co.,
483 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(citing Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 331
A.2d 424 (Pa. 1975); Vogel v. W.T. Grant
Co., 327 A.2d 133, 136 (Pa. 1974)).
Although the state law complaint does not
specify which privacy tort Appellants
advance, the only cause of action arguably
relevant to the interception of oral
communications in this case is intrusion
upon Appellants’ seclusion.  The
Pennsylvania courts have defined this
claim, in accordance with the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1977), as follows: “One
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who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”  Harris, 483 A.2d at 1383
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
652B).  Like Appellants’ Wiretap Act
claim, this cause of action also requires
that the plaintiff have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.  See id. (“The
defendant is subject to liability under this
section only when he has intruded into a
private place, or has otherwise invaded a
private seclusion that the plaintiff has
thrown about his person or affairs.” (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt.
c)).
With respect to Appellants’
invasion of privacy claim, Dana and SGI
present arguments identical to those they
raise in favor of extinguishing the Wiretap
Act claims – namely that the expectation
of privacy issue and the “highly offensive
to a reasonable person” issue must be
determined in the light of the collective
bargaining agreement.  Again, based on
Trans Penn West, we reject these
arguments.  
3.
As for Appellants’ remaining tort
claims – negligent or reckless supervision
of Defendants’ officers, agents, servants;
negligent or reckless supervision of
Defendants’ premises or instrumentalities
under their control; and failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect Appellants as
business invitees – Dana and SGI argue
that we must find these claims completely
preempted under Electrical Workers
(IBEW) v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987),
and Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362,
364 (1990).  
Neither Hechler nor Rawson is
applicable to Appellants’ tort claims.  In
Hechler, an employee of Florida Power
and Light Company sued her union after
she was injured performing a repair to an
electrical substation.  The basis of her
claim was that the union had breached a
duty it assumed, pursuant to the relevant
collective-bargaining agreement, to ensure
that she would not be required or allowed
to take undue risks in the performance of
her duties which were not commensurate
with her training and experience.  The
Court held that this claim was completely
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA because
it was not sufficiently independent of the
c o l l ec t i v e- b a r g a in i n g  a g re e m en t .
According to the Court, the plaintiff’s tort
claim was based on her allegation that her
union owed her a duty of care, but
“[u]nder common law . . . it is the
employer, not a labor union, that owes
employees a duty to exercise reasonable
care in providing a safe workplace.”  Id. at
859.  Accordingly, the Court reasoned, the
plaintiff’s “allegations of negligence
assume significance if – and only if – the
Union, in fact, had assumed the duty of
care that the complaint alleges the Union
breached.”  Id. at 861.  In order to
determine the union’s tort liability, a court
would have to examine the duty assumed
by the union in the collective-bargaining
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agreement and the scope of that duty.
This, according to the Court, was precisely
the type of contract interpretation that
implicated the complete preemption
doctrine.  As in Allis-Chalmers, the Court
held, the plaintiff was “precluded from
evading the pre-emptive force of § 301 by
casting her claim as a state tort action.”  Id.
Similarly, in Rawson, the plaintiffs,
survivors of four miners who were killed
in an underground mine fire, brought state
law wrongful death actions against the
deceaseds’ union alleging that the deaths
were caused by the union’s fraudulent and
negligent acts.  The plaintiffs’ claims were
based on the contention that the union had,
through a collective-bargaining agreement
with the mine operator, caused to be
established a management-labor safety
committee.  The plaintiffs argued that the
union representatives had negligently
performed inspections that the union had
promised to conduct, failing to uncover
obvious deficiencies.  The Supreme Court,
as in Hechler, again held that the wrongful
death claim against the union was
completely preempted.  The Court noted
that, like Hechler, the plaintiffs’ pleadings
indicated that the duty of care relied on as
the basis of their tort suit was one
allegedly assumed by the union in a
collective bargaining agreement.  The
Court further reasoned:
As we see it . . . , [the
plaintiffs’] tort claim cannot
be described as independent
of the collective-bargaining
agreement.  This is not a
situation where the Union’s
delegates are accused of
acting in a way that might
v i o l a te  t h e  d u ty o f
reasonable care owed to
every person in society.
There is no allegation, for
example, that members of
the sa fety comm ittee
negligently caused damage
to the structure of the mine,
an act that could be
unreasonable irrespective of
who committed it and could
foreseeably cause injury to
any person who might
possibly be in the vicinity.
. . .  If the Union failed to
p e r f o r m  a  d u t y  i n
connection with inspection,
it was a duty arising out of
the collective-bargaining
agreement signed by the
Union as the bargaining
agent for the miners.
Clearly, the enforcement of
that agreement and the
remedies for its breach are
matters governed by federal
law.  . . .  Pre-emption by
federal law cannot be
avoided by characterizing
the Union’s negligent
performance of what it does
on behalf of the members of
the bargaining unit pursuant
to the term s of the
c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g
contract as a state-law tort.
Id. at 371-72.  Accordingly, the Court
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held, the plaintiffs’ suit could only go
forward under federal law.
In relying on Hechler and Rawson,
Dana and SGI refuse to acknowledge that
the duty of care in both of those cases was
alleged to have arisen from a collective-
bargaining agreement.  In both of those
cases, the unions, which did not otherwise
have any duty of care under state law, were
the defendants being sued.  In this case,
however, Appellants’ claims did not
invoke any duty of care prescribed by the
CBA, and no consultation with the CBA is
necessary in order to define the scope of
the duties alleged to have been breached.
Accordingly, whatever duties Dana was
alleged to have had with respect to
supervision its employees, agents and
premises, or protection of business
invitees, those duties are independent of
the CBA.  As such, Appellants’ claims
arising from negligent or reckless breach
of those duties are not completely
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
4.
Section 16 of New Jersey’s
Detective Act provides, in relevant part:
It is unlawful for the holder
of a license issued under this
act, or for any employee of
such licensee, knowingly to
commit any of the following
acts, within or without the
C o m m o n w e a l t h  o f
Pennsylvania: . . . to
interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to
form, join, or assist any
labor organization of their
own choosing, to interfere
or hinder the lawful or
p e a c e f u l  c o l l e c t i v e
b a r g a i n i n g  b e t w e e n
employees and employers,
to pay, offer, or give any
money, gratuity, favor,
consideration, or other thing
of value, directly or
indirectly, to any person, for
any verbal or written report
of the lawful activities of
employees in the exercise of
t he i r  r i gh t  o f  s e l f -
organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations,
and to bargain collectively
through representatives of
their own choosing, . . . . 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 26.  In order to
state a cause of action for civil conspiracy
under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must
allege: “(1) a combination of two or more
persons acting with a common purpose to
do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by
unlawful means or for an unlawful
purpose; (2) an overt act done in pursuance
of the common purpose; and (3) actual
legal damage.”  McGuire v. Shubert, 722
A.2d 1087, 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(citing Kadel v. McMonigle, 624 A.2d
1059, 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).  
Ap pellants’ De tect ive Act
conspiracy claim is not based on any right
or duty created by the collective
bargaining agreement, and litigation of
that claim will not require interpretation of
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that agreement.  It necessarily follows that
§ 301 does not completely preempt this
claim.
This conclusion is not inconsistent
with San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and its
progeny.  It is true that to the extent
Appellants  assert that Defendants
interfered with their rights to form, join, or
assist a labor union, as well as their rights
to collective bargaining, these claims
appear to be preempted by §§ 7 and 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158.5
This did not provide the District Court
with subject matter jurisdiction, however.
In San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959), the Supreme Court held that
“[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be
assumed that the activities which a State
purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, or
constitute an unfair labor practice under §
8, due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield.”
Thus, §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA may
provide Defendants with a preemption
defense to Appellants’ claims under § 16
of the Detective Act upon remand to the
state court.  Such preemption, however, is
not the type of complete preemption that
would provide Defendants with a basis for
federal question jurisdiction.  See Ethridge
v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d
1389, 1396-1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that “sections 7 and 8 [of the NLRA] do
not confer original federal question
jurisdiction on the federal district courts”);
United Ass’n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting
Indus., Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power
Corp., 834 F.2d 884, 886-87 (10th Cir.
1987) (same); see also Caterpillar, 482
U.S. at 392-93 (distinguishing between
preemption as a defense to a state law
claim and complete preemption as a basis
for federal question jurisdiction). 
     5Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain
c o l l e c t i v e l y  t h r o u g h
representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such
activities except to the
extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a
labor organization as a
condition of employment as
author ized in  sect io n
158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157.  Section 8(a)(1) provides,
in relevant part that “[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
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C.
In summary, Appellants’ claims do
not involve rights or duties created by the
collective bargaining agreement.  Nor do
those claims raise “‘questions relating to
what the parties to a labor agreement
agreed, and what legal consequences were
intended to flow from breaches of that
agreement.’” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 122-23
(quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211).  Rather,
our analysis indicates that the state laws
invoked by Appellants confer upon them
substantive rights that are independent of
any rights available under the CBA.
Under such circumstances, the Supreme
Court has held, it would be inconsistent
with Congress’ intent under § 301 to find
complete preemption.  See Allis-
Chambers, 471 U.S. at 212.  
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the
judgment of the District Court will be
vacated and this case will be remanded to
the District Court with instructions to
remand it to the Court of Common Pleas
of Berks County, Pennsylvania.
